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There are two myths about the United Kingdom. The first is that we do not have a constitution
and did not have any human rights law until very recently. The second myth, very much tied to
the first, is that human rights is a new topic. I find that most law students seem to think that they
alone have thought about fundamental human rights and that the rest of the world knows nothing
about it. As with most myths, however, none of these is absolutely true.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM*
Lord Gordon Slynn**
There are two myths about the United Kingdom. The first
is that we do not have a constitution and did not have any
human rights law until very recently. The second myth, very
much tied to the first, is that human rights is a new topic.1 I find
that most law students seem to think that they alone have
thought about fundamental human rights and that the rest of
the world knows nothing about it. As with most myths, however,
none of these is absolutely true.
Let us address the second myth first. The origin of human
rights law extends back to the beginning of Western civilization,
to the Greeks and the Romans. 2 Much of what we now consider
modern human rights law can be found in the basis of funda-
mental rights widely recognized by Greek and Roman lawyers.'
Natural law, or what the Romans called ius naturale, was a central
theme of Roman political and legal thinking.4 When Saint Paul
* This Article was originally presented as a lecture entitled The Development of
Human Rights in the U.K. at the Fordham University School of Law on Tuesday,
November 18, 2003, for Professor Roger Goebel's European Union and the Law class.
** The Right Honourable The Lord Slynn of Hadley was appointed the Queen's
Counsel in 1974, then moved to the judiciary in 1976 as Judge on the High Court of
Justice (Queen's Bench Division). He was subsequently appointed to the Employment
Appeals Tribunal. In 1981, he became Advocate-General at the European Court of
Justice and then Judge of that Court in 1988. He has since been named as one of the
law lords of the House of Lords, the highest court of the United Kingdom.
1. See Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX.
INr'L L. J. 329, 331-32 (2002) (arguing that although no "self-contained" written docu-
ment exists "differentiated from other areas of law," this is not the only definition of a
constitution); see also Simon Lee, Bicentennial Bork, Tercentennial Spycatcher: Do the British
Need A Bill of Rights?, 49 U. PrtT. L. REv. 777, 779 (1988) (arguing that England already
has a Bill of Rights and is about to celebrate its tercentenary).
2. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Rights on the Eve of the Next Century: Beyond
Vienna and Beijing, 66 FoR-HAm L. REv. 273, 295-96 n.87 (1997).
3. See generally FRED D. MILLER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND RiGHTS, IN ARISTOTLE'S
POLITICS (1995) (noting the Greek and Roman origins of human rights ideas).
4. See David V. Snyder, The Romanist Tradition in Louisiana: Legislation, Jurisprudence
and Doctrine, 56 LA. L. REv. 423, 424-25 (1995) (explaining relationship of ius naturale to
idea of "natural obligation" and other legal concepts in Roman law); see also David No-
vak, Judaism and Natural Law, 43 AM. J.Jutus. 117, 130-31 (1998) (discussing ins gentium
and is naturale as tools of Roman imperialism).
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said, "Yes, I am [a Roman citizen],"' he was insisting on those
fundamental rights to which, as a Roman citizen, he was entitled.
One distinction between Saint Paul's statement and human
rights today, of course, is that in Saint Paul's time, only Roman
citizens could enjoy fundamental human rights.6 It is important
to be aware, however, that these ideas were not all concocted in
the twenty-first century. They have been around a long time and
have been elaborated on over the centuries by critical notions of
Christian, Islamic, and Judaic teaching. 7 Thus, we begin with
the development of human rights law in the United Kingdom by
going a long way back indeed.
In the times since the Greeks and the Romans, major devel-
opments in human rights law have also had an enormous impact
on human rights in England. Magna Carta,8 to which U.S.
judges and lawyers have always attached such great importance,
made a considerable contribution to the notion of fundamental
rights.9 According to Magna Carta, "[n] o man shall be punished
except by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.., to
none should justice be denied."' Then follows the familiar
phrase, "due process of law should be observed."11 Most U.S.
lawyers, even academics, tend to give the impression that the
phrase "due process" is a U.S. invention. 2 Although discussion
of due process of law today most commonly occurs in the con-
5. Acts 22:27 (NM); cf. Acts 22:25 ("Is it legal for you to flog a Roman Citizen who
hasn't even been found guilty?").
6. See Alan Watson, Thinking Property at Rome, 68 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1355 (1993)
(discussing the implications of the Roman consideration of slaves as both "property and
human beings" who are "denied legal personality"). See generally ALAN WATSON, ROmAN
SLAVE LAw (1987).
7. See, e.g., Novak, supra note 4, at 130-31 (discussing the history of natural law in
Jewish thought).
8. MAGNA CARTA (1215).
9. Both the British and the U.S. Bill of Rights drew much of their influence and
inspiration from the Magna Carta. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; see also ENGLISH BILL OF
RiGHTS (1689), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/england.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 28, 2004).
10. MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215), reprinted inJ.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 327 (1965)
("No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any
way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful [judgment] of his
peers or by the law of the land").
11. Id.
12. See generally JOHN V. ORTm, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY (2003)
(tracing the history of due process from its origins in medieval England to its applica-
tions in American constitutionalism).
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text of constitutional theory, many of its fundamental principles
actually originated in Magna Carta, which laid the foundation
centuries ago.1 3 In the United Kingdom, these ideas from
Magna Carta, as well as from the Greeks and the Romans, have
been developed over the centuries. In seventeenth-century En-
gland, for instance, notions of due process were incorporated
into the English Bill of Rights, 4 which along with Magna Carta,
continues to be cited in the courts today.15 In a recent appeal
before the Privy Council, five Jamaican men sentenced to death
by hanging initially claimed that they were wrongfully convicted,
and subsequently appealed the constitutionality of the death
sentence itself.16 On a third appeal, they accepted their guilt as
well as the constitutionality of the death sentence, but alleged
that the method of the sentence's execution constituted a form
of cruel and inhuman punishment contrary to both Magna Carta
and the English Bill of Rights.1 7 Unfortunately for the men in
this case, Magna Carta has been subject to subsequent parlia-
mentary statutes identifying death by hanging as the only means
of execution in Jamaica.'" Thus, though Magna Carta did not
do any good for the men in this case, its appearance does pro-
vide some insight into just how far back such thinking can be
traced.
In addition to native English ideas, human rights declara-
tions in other countries have also influenced the development of
human rights in the United Kingdom. The almost universal im-
pact of the Declaration of the Rights of Man," approved by the
National Assembly of France in 1789, provides a case in point."
13. See id.; see also National Archives and Records Administration, Magna Carta and
Its American Legacy, at http://www.archives.gov (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
14. ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689).
15. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 1, at 779.
16. See Lewis v. Attorney-Gen. of Jamaica, [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C. 2000).
17. See id.
18. See id.; see also SeekingJustice Closer to Home, BBC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2478665.stm (discussing the status of the
death penalty in former British colonies of the Caribbean).
19. DECLARATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN [DECLARATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN] (France 1789) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF MAN].
20. See Christine Loudes, The Emergence of the Political Myth of Human Rights: The
French 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, U. NOTTINGHAM STUDENT
HUM. RTS. L. CENTRE NEWSL., Feb. 14, 1997 (arguing that the influence of the 1789
Declaration is greater than that of the English Bill of Rights or American Petitions of
Rights).
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According to the introduction, "[t] he aim of all political associa-
tion is the conservation of the natural and inalienable rights of
man, such rights being liberty, property, security, and resistance
to tyranny."2' Appearing two years before the French Declara-
tion, the Constitution of the United States expressed similar sen-
timents, many of which have also had an enormous impact on
the development of English law.2 2
It is important to note that the United Kingdom differs
from other countries in that it has not promulgated any written
constitutional statement of human rights.23 English courts have
also refrained from positively creating rights within their deci-
sions. 24 English law has developed on the basic presumption
that individuals can do what they like as long as it is not contrary
to the law.25 As a result, England has not needed any laws af-
firming such fundamental rights as freedom of expression: one
can speak freely as long as the speech is not defamatory, treason-
able, or sacrilegious. 26 In the United Kingdom, the right to free-
dom of expression remains unlimited unless there is positive re-
striction.27 The same doctrine applies to freedom of movement
and to property rights: there being no need to declare the right
to property, since people can own and develop property as long
as such ownership or use does not contravene an existing law.2 8
Human rights in England have therefore developed negatively
in response to a lack of common law restrictions. 29 Hence,
though the United Kingdom does not have a modern Bill of
Rights like the French Declaration or the American Constitu-
tion, its citizens have never felt that they suffer from human
21. DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN, supra note 19.
22. See Loudes, supra note 20.
23. See Christopher D. Jenkins, The Institutional and Substantive Effects of the Human
Rights Act in the United Kingdom, 24 DALHOUSIE LJ. 218, 220 (2001).
24. See id. at 226.
25. See id. at 227. The United Kingdom has traditionally adopted a negative ap-
proach to fundamental rights based on the idea that the citizen enjoys the freedom to
do as she pleases and that any interference must be justified by law. See Vick, supra note
1, at 341; see also Attorney-Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), 1 A.C. 109, 283-84
(H.L. 1990) ("Whereas [A]rticle 10 of the [European] Convention... proceeds to state
a fundamental right and then to qualify it, we in this country ... proceed rather upon
the assumption of freedom of speech, and turn to our law to discover the established
exceptions to it").
26. SeeJenkins, supra note 23, at 228.
27. See id. at 228-29.
28. See id. at 229.
29. See id. at 227.
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rights violations any more than anyone else.3 °
Up through the nineteenth century, human rights had been
almost entirely limited to the domestic sphere. Countries gener-
ally developed their own human rights traditions and standards,
many of which were enforceable only within their own borders
and very often available only to their own citizens.31 Following
the appalling incidents of the twentieth century, however, came
one of the most fundamental changes to human rights dis-
course, not only within the United Kingdom, but throughout the
world.32 This came about through the emergence of the Charter
of the United Nations ("U.N. Charter") and the Universal Dec-
laration on Human Rights ("UDHR"), 4 which provided the
foundation for an entirely new direction in the development of
human rights.35 This new era did not come about through a
revolution, as it had in France or the United States.3 6 Rather, it
was a reaction to the atrocities committed in the 1930s and 1940s
in Europe; atrocities which made people realize the failure of
ordinary law to prevent such occurrences.3 7 One could not sim-
ply rely on judges to protect human rights against the sort of
savage violations perpetrated in Germany and other European
countries during this period. 38 Thus emerged the development,
not just of national human rights law, but of international
30. But see Anthony Lester, The British System Isn't Working, GuARDiAN, Aug. 3, 2004,
at 18 (arguing that a written constitution is necessary to protect basic civil and political
rights in England).
31. See Fred L. Morrison, The Significance of Nuremberg for Modern International Law,
149 MIL. L. REv. 207, 210 (1995) (citing OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 124 (1st ed.
1905) (stating that "a State may treat its subjects according to its discretion")).
32. See Steven Greer, A Guide to Human Rights Act 1988, 24(1) EUR. L. REv. 3
(1999).
33. U.N. CHARTER (proclaiming the universal existence of human rights and estab-
lishing the United Nations as the entity to ensure their protection).
34. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
35. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty", 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
31, 34 (1996) (arguing that the U.N. Charter heralded the birth of international
human rights).
36. See Henkin, supra note 35, at 40 n.34.
37. See Ema Orji, Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A Universal Human
Rights Perspective, 25 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 431, 482 n.1 (2001).
38. See Kristin N. Wuerifel, Discrimination Among Rights?: A Nation's Legislating a
Hierarchy of Human Rights in the Context of International Human Rights Customary Law, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 374-75 (1998) (claming that World War II atrocities led to a realiza-
tion of the centrality of human rights and the need to develop international standards
for their protection).
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human rights law.39 According to even post-War editions of Op-
penheim's International Law, international law does not protect
individual human rights in any way. 4° Nor could anyone com-
plain before an international court that his rights had been vio-
lated. 41 This is the change that took place, and the basis for the
post-war development of universal human rights in the United
Kingdom and around the world.4 2 Beyond the U.N. Charter and
the UDHR, dozens of international conventions have formed
over the years, covering everything from the elimination of racial
discrimination to the protection of civil and political rights as
well as social and cultural rights.43 The following is an attempt
to discuss how these international agreements have affected the
United Kingdom.
According to Judge Rosalyn Higgins, currently the British
judge on the International Court of Justice in The Hague, "the
great change came in the States when international law provided
a yardstick by which human rights could be measured. The con-
duct of States had to be regulated by what the Charter said."44
This had two consequences. In order for the United Nations to
establish a means of enforcing human rights around the world,
it first had to come up with a universal definition of human
rights.45 The U.N. Charter's references to "fundamental human
rights" suggest that rights are absolute and, as such, capable of
expression and enforcement in the same way in every country
39. See Natan Lerner, A Secular View of Human Rights, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 67, 75
(2000); cf. Morrison, supra note 31, at 211 (pointing out the importance of nationality
as a prerequisite for the enforcement of international human rights by Western Na-
tions).
40. See Lerner, supra note 39, at 68; see also Lucy Reed, Great Expectations: Where Does
the Proliferation of International Dispute Resolution Tribunals Leave International Law, 96 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 219, 221 (1992) (stating that States' international legal obligations
relating to individuals were owed to States whose nationality individuals possessed).
41. See Rebeca Rios-Kohn, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Progress and Chal-
lenges, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'' 139, 155 (1998) (listing five methods of promot-
ing and protecting human rights under international law).
42. See Stephen P. Marks & Burns H. Weston, International Human Rights at Fifty: A
Foreword, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 114-15 (1998) (noting the enormous
impact of UDHR on national and international human rights).
43. See Lerner, supra note 39, at 68.
44. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, Remarks at the Hague Academic Lecture.
45. See LordJohan Steyn, Human Rights: The Legacy of Mrs. Roosevelt, 2002-AUT PuB.
L. 473, 475-76 (2002) (noting various attempts to come up with a definition of human
rights following the establishment of the U.N. Charter).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
around the world.4 6 It is easy to see why this idea would never
work out. In the first place, the sort of rights requiring protec-
tion in an Asian country or an African village are quite different
from those people would expect to have in New York or in the
United Kingdom.4 7 It also became clear that the enforcement
mechanism set up by the United Nations, based on mandatory
State reporting mechanisms and individual petitions alleging
human rights violations, did not offer sufficient protection ei-
ther within the United Kingdom or anywhere else.4 8 This is
where Europe has taken the lead with respect to the rest of the
world.49 It is not surprising considering the terrible conditions
in Europe during the middle of the twentieth century, but it is
remarkable - and people in the future will find it remarkable
- that European States realized that something had to be done
and that they took the initiative to develop a more effective sys-
tem.50  Hence, the creation of the European Convention on
Human Rights ("European Convention"),l intended to give ef-
fect to the U.N. Charter.52 Perhaps more remarkable is that the
United Kingdom, and even previously warring countries like
France and Germany, were able to come together and agree that
human rights ought to be expressed and enforced in a way
which would be acceptable to all of them.53
How have such rights been enforced and how has this af-
fected the human rights tradition of the United Kingdom? En-
gland helped draft the European Convention and became one
46. See id. at 476 (discussing the initial failure of the U.N. Charter to gain interna-
tional legitimacy).
47. See id. at 477 (noting that differences in culture, economics, and politics
among countries made an agreement on a uniform text difficult to achieve).
48. See Nigel S. Rodley, The Evolution of United Nations' Charter-Based Machinery for the
Protection of Human Rights, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 4 (1997). Despite its ostensible aim
to defend fundamental rights, the U.N. Charter refrained from addressing general and
individual reports of human rights violations for the first 20 years of its existence. See id.
49. See Rolv Ryssdal, The Coming of Age of the European Convention on Human Rights, 1
EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 18, 19 (1996) (highlighting three crucial developments initiated
by the European Convention on Human Rights ("European Convention") that signifi-
cantly changed the structure of traditional international law).
50. See id. at 29 (noting that the European Convention allows States to commit
themselves fully to an international system of human rights protection).
51. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
52. See Steyn, supra note 45, at 479-80.
53. See LivJaeckel, The Duty to Protect Fundamental Rights in the European Community,
28(4) EUR. L. REv. 508, 526 (2003).
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of the first to sign and ratify it. 4 This did not mean, however,
that an English citizen could go directly to an English judge and
ask him to enforce Article Four or Five of the European Conven-
tion. Under British law, no international treaty or convention is
enforceable in the national courts unless the United Kingdom
Parliament first makes it part of domestic law.55 Therefore,
though the European Convention had aroused enthusiastic sup-
port since its ratification, the national courts did not initially en-
force it. If a British subject wished to allege a violation of the
European Convention, he had to appear before the trial court,
court of appeal, and the House of Lords in order to claim his
right as expressed in the European Convention.56 In judgments
passed down during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, English judges
circumvented the problem by basing their decisions on the rec-
ognition, in English common law, of well-established rights simi-
lar to those expressed in the European Convention.5 7 In other
words, one could say what one liked as long as it was not blasphe-
mous, defamatory, sacrilege, or seditious.58
It is easy to see why this was not satisfactory. It is quite ab-
surd that English judges should lack the power to investigate or
enforce many of the fundamental rights declared in the Euro-
pean Convention, and equally ridiculous that citizens should be
forced to go all the way to the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg ("Strasbourg Court") in order to enforce those
rights.59 I remember going to Strasbourg to represent the Brit-
ish government in a case where a prisoner had sought to write a
letter to solicitors alleging a violation of his rights as a prisoner.60
The governor, however, had the power under a British statute to
stop this correspondence from leaving the prison, and he did
not allow the letter to go forward. 61 Not surprisingly, the pris-
54. See Steyn, supra note 45, at 479.
55. See id. at 479.
56. See, e.g., Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 1 All E.R. 881 (C.A.
1977) (stating that international law has no validity except as adopted by domestic law).
57. See, e.g., Sci. Research Council v. Nasse, A.C. 1028, 1068 (H.L. 1980); see also
Greer, supra note 32, at 4 (noting the concern that incorporating European Conven-
tion into domestic law would compromise parliamentary sovereignty and subject com-
mon law to the influence of foreign judiciaries).
58. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., David Feldman, Remedies for Violations of Convention Rights Under the
Human Rights Act, 6 EUR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 691, 691-92 (1998).
60. See Golder v. United Kingdom, [1979] 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 524, 528.
61. See id. at 524.
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oner found a lawyer willing to argue that the governor's act con-
stituted a violation of his rights under the European Convention.
The case eventually went to the European Commission, but the
prisoner was forced to travel to Strasbourg to bring it. It was
quite absurd. Any judge in the United Kingdom would have
come to the same conclusion merely by looking at the text of the
Convention itself.62
Very much based on United Nations documents, the Euro-
pean Convention laid down a number of important rights.63
The right to life would seem fairly obvious. The law should pro-
tect everybody's right to life, and should not intentionally de-
prive anyone of his life, save in execution of a court sentence
following his conviction for a crime for which the death penalty
is provided.64 It sounds like a simple statement: you shall not
take a person's life. The Strasbourg Court, however, was asked
to say that it also requires the State to ensure that a person's life
is protected under circumstances in which the State is responsi-
ble for him. Last year, the House of Lords gave a judgment on a
case involving an English prisoner murdered by his cellmate.65
An English prisoner, obviously psychotic and extremely racist,
murdered a man of Asian extraction. Following the murder, the
Commission for Racial Equality inquired as to how this had
come about.6 6 The victim's family claimed that the State's fail-
ure to prevent the murder violated the victim's right to life, for
which the State was ultimately responsible.67 The State, of
course, had not killed him. This case did not involve a police-
man or soldier shooting and killing somebody under unlawful
circumstances, and yet the State had custody of the prisoner
when the murder took place. According to the victim's family,
by placing a known racist prone to violence in the same cell as
an Asian prisoner, the State had subjected the victim to a serious
62. See generally Feldman, supra note 59.
63. See, e.g., Todd Howland, Rael v. Taylor and the Colorado Constitution: How Human
Rights Law Ensures Constitutional Protection in the Private Sphere, 26 DENV. J. INT'L. L. &
POL'Y. 1, 16 (1997).
64. See European Convention, supra note 51, art. 2(1).
65. See Regina (Amin) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 1 A.C. 653 (H.L.
2004).
66. See id. 12.
67. See Regina (Amin) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 4 All E.R. 336, 1
(C.A. 2002).
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risk of injury or death.68 Moreover, by refusing to hold a public
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the murder, the
State allegedly violated not only the victim's rights, but also those
of his next-of-kin.69
Over the years, the Strasbourg Court has held that the right
to life does not simply prohibit the taking of life.70 The State
also has a responsibility to take reasonable steps to protect a per-
son under its custody.71 Because the right to life has now be-
come part of domestic law, the case was allowed to come before
the English courts, where the State was held to have clearly vio-
lated its obligations to protect this particular prisoner.72 The
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the State could only be
liable if the murder had taken place at the hands of a State em-
ployee, in this case a prison officer.73 The House of Lords, how-
ever, held that this was far too narrow an interpretation and that
the State had clearly violated the prisoner's right to life pursuant
to Article Two of the Convention. 4 Specifically, the authorities
failed to do two things: to protect the prisoner by ensuring that
he did not share a cell with a violent racist, and to investigate
how the murder had occurred.75 This may seem somewhat of an
extension, but as a result of the Strasbourg decisions, the right to
life has begun to include the right to have a full inquiry made as
68. See id. 30.
69. See id. 47 (noting that the next-of-kin of the victim must be involved in the
investigative procedure to the extent necessary to safeguard his or her legitimate inter-
ests).
70. See id. 1 30; see also McCann v. United Kingdom, [1996] 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97,
137, 181 (stating that Article 2(1) is one of the European Convention's most funda-
mental provisions).
71. See Osman v. United Kingdom, [2000] 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 277, 89 (noting
that Article 2(1) enjoins a State to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those
within its jurisdiction); see also Salman v. Turkey, [2002] 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 425, 483,
103 (holding that authorities have a duty to protect persons in custody).
72. See Regina (Amin) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, EWHC Admin. 719,
91 (Q.B. 2001), available at 2001 ATL 1135068 (noting that "serious human failings"
contributed to the prisoner's death).
73. See Regina (Amin) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 4 All E.R. 336, 1 75
(C.A. 2002) (holding that the Secretary of State's refusal to hold a public inquiry of the
circumstances surrounding the prisoner's death at the request of victim's family did not
violate Article 2 of the European Convention).
74. See Regina (Amin) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 1 A.C. 653, 30 (H.L.
2004) (holding that Article 2 includes a duty to take steps to prevent life being taken
and therefore an obligation to investigate circumstances surrounding a prisoner's
death).
75. See id. 1 40.
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to how and why its deprivation could have occurred.76
Article 3 of the European Convention prohibits torture.77
This may seem an unlikely issue for a case originating in an En-
glish countryside or suburb to come before the Strasbourg
Court, but there have been some quite serious cases involving
allegations of torture which have resulted in judgments against
the United Kingdom. 78 Article 5 of the Convention provides the
right to liberty and security, a seemingly simple matter for the
English courts to address but one which has led to a large num-
ber of cases involving a violation of the right.7 9 I heard a case in
which individuals who had come to England seeking political
asylum were detained in a camp for a week so that their applica-
tions might be investigated more quickly.8 0 The camp at which
they stayed was comfortable, had provisions for medical atten-
tion, and contained remarkable facilities for education and relig-
ious worship. The fact remained, however, that these people
had been detained. They had lost their liberty, and the question
before the court was whether such detention constituted a viola-
tion of Article 5." While the trial judge answered in the affirma-
tive, the House of Lords adopted a more realistic approach by
balancing the benefits of a speedy decision regarding asylum-sta-
tus in the United Kingdom against the harm caused by their de-
tention." Given that the plaintiffs were detained for a relatively
short time and that their cases were dealt with relatively quickly,
the House of Lords concluded that their detention was not un-
reasonable and therefore not a violation of Article 5.8
One of the provisions of the European Convention which
has had the greatest impact in the United Kingdom has been the
76. See id. 31 (discussing the procedural duty of the State to publicly investigate
the death of individuals in custody before an independent judicial tribunal so as to
ensure that all facts are disclosed).
77. According to Article 3, "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." European Convention, supra note 51, art. 3.
78. See, e.g., A v. United Kingdom, [1999] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611; Z & Others v.
United Kingdom, [2002] 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97.
79. See European Convention, supra note 51, art. 5. See generally 1 COUNCIL OF Eu-
ROPE, DIGEST OF STRASBOURG CASE - LAw RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 282-87 (1984).
80. SeeR (Saadi) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 1 W.L.R. 3131 (H.L. 2002).
81. See id. 27.
82. See id. 47.
83. See id. 49.
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right to a fair trial.8 4 The Convention provides that a trial shall
be held in public within a reasonable time and shall be subject to
all necessary safeguards.8 5 United Nations documents contain
similar provisions, though most of them pertain to trials them-
selves.86 But what about individuals who are denied a trial?
Does the right to a fair trial include the right of access to a
court? Many have argued that English law contains no such pro-
vision guaranteeing people the right of access to a court, and
that the right to a fair trial therefore applies only once you make
it into court.87 The Strasbourg Court, however, held that the
right to a fair trial in England includes a right of access to a
court in due time and a right to adequate legal representation.88
Such rulings demonstrate the pervasive effect of the European
Convention on human rights law in the United Kingdom.
One could talk extensively about the detailed articles which
the Strasbourg Court has enforced within the United Kingdom
over the last fifty years. Protection of property has been crucial,
as well as the right to education.89 The English government has
also complied with the rulings of the European Court of Justice
("ECJ").° Given that the decisions of the Strasbourg Court tend
to be liberal, however, some have criticized it for recognizing
rights that appear absurd to British eyes. 91 One famous case in-
84. See generally John Andrews & Ann Sherlock, Right to a Fair Trial, 19(4) EUR. L.
REV. 433 (1994) (surveying prominent case-law from the Strasbourg Court dealing with
alleged infringements of rights described in Article 6 of the European Convention).
85. See European Convention, supra note 51, art. 6.
86. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court ofJustice, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 5,
arts. 42, 46, 59, available at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited Dec. 28, 2004).
87. See generally Tom Hickman, The "Uncertain Shadow": Throwing Light on the Right
to a Court Under Article 6(1) ECHt, 2004-SPR PuB. L. 122-45 (2004).
88. See id.; see also 2 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DIGEST OF STRASBOURG CASE-LAw RELAT-
ING TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 425-41 (1984).
89. See, e.g., Air Canada v. United Kingdom, [1995] 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 150; Camp-
bell & Another v. United Kingdom, [19821 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293.
90. For a discussion of the circumstances under which the European Court ofJus-
tice has invalidated member State action, see Darcy S. Binder, The European Court of
Justice and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Community, at http://www.
jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/95/9504ind.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
91. See, e.g., Lord Leonard Hoffman, Human Rights and the House of Lords, 62 MOD.
L. REv. 159, 164 (1999) ("Under the cover of an Article which says that everyone is
entitled to have his civil rights and obligations determined by a tribunal, the European
Court of Human Rights is taking upon itself to decide what the content of those civil
rights should be... [thereby] challenging the autonomy of the Courts and indeed the
Parliament of the United Kingdom to deal with what are essentially social welfare ques-
tions").
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volved a student who had been caned by the headmaster of his
school, and who claimed that the caning constituted a form of
cruel and inhuman punishment in violation of the European
Convention.9 2 In a majority decision, the Court ruled this form
of corporal punishment to be impermissible.9" Writing sepa-
rately, however, the British judge stated that he did not believe
that the caning had done any harm and certainly did not con-
sider it torture or inhuman treatment.9 4 Recent cases concern-
ing freedom of the press, the rights of transsexuals, and the
rights of people of the same sex have also led to the creation of
important precedent within the United Kingdom.95 Thus, if the
first phase of human rights development in England was exem-
plified by the British rule that one can do what one likes so long
as it is not unlawful, the second strand was initiated in the U.N.
Charter, developed in the European Convention, and enforced
through the Strasbourg Court.
The effect in the United Kingdom of its membership in the
European Union, then the European Community, also remains
important. The Treaty of Rome96 does not deal with human
rights as such.9 7 It does, however set forth equal pay for equal
work as a basic human right.98 This provision led, in the United
Kingdom, to many decisions in favor of women's rights in the
employment sphere.99 It is curious that most of the cases involv-
ing women's right to equal treatment, 100 equal work, 10 1 and
92. See Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, [1995] 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 112.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 138 (concurring Opinion of Freeland, J.) ("I have not been satisfied
that, in its own particular circumstances, the nature, purpose and effects of the punish-
ment . . . were sufficient to bring it within what is in my view the true scope of the
protection afforded by [Article 3 of the European Convention]").
95. See, e.g., Bowman v. United Kingdom, [1998] 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1; Sheffield &
Horsham v. United Kingdom, [1999] 27 Eur. H.R. Rep 163; Smith & Another v. United
Kingdom, [2000] 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493.
96. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC
Treaty].
97. See generally id.
98. See id. art. 119.
99. See, e.g., Bob A. Hepple, Social Rights in the European Economic Community: A
British Perspective, 11 COMP. LAB. L. 425, 431 (1990); see also SACHA PREcHiAL & NOREEN
BuRROws, GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAw OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 205-30 (1990).
100. See Council Directive No. 76/207, O.J. L 39 (1976) [hereinafter Equal Treat-
ment Directive].
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equal pay1 2 have come from the United Kingdom.' 3 This is
largely because no previous provision in English legislation pro-
vided for equal rights for women in employment.10 4 The ECJ
recognized equal rights for women in employment in certain ar-
eas.1°5 A provision in the Treaty of Rome also prohibits discrimi-
nation on the ground of nationality,'0 6 a provision that, accord-
ing to the ECJ, reflects a general principle of law." 7 Thus, in
England, the third strand of human rights law - equal pay,
equal treatment, and the principle of non-discrimination on the
ground of nationality - derived from the European Union.
There is no provision in the Treaty of Rome itself, however,
that enforces human rights within the European Community.0 8
This is where the ECJ came in. In the beginning, the ECJ had
indicated that it would not enforce the European Convention
because the responsibility rested with the Strasbourg Court." 9
The European Convention did not include the European Com-
munity as a party because only States may constitute European
Convention parties."' 0 The ECJ also held that the European
Community did not have the power to accede to the European
Convention. 1 ' At first, therefore, it appeared that the ECJ
could not enforce human rights in the European Community.
But this was not the end of the road,'1 2 for the ECJ then held
that the member States of the European Community must have
intended that some fundamental rights were to be available to
citizens and residents of the European Community. There were
101. See Perceval-Price & Ors v. Dept. of Economic Development & Ors, [2000]
I.R.L.R. 380 (I.R. C.A.).
102. See EEC Treaty, supra note 96, art. 119; Equal Treatment Directive, supra note
100, art. 1.
103. See Rachel A. Cichowski, Constitutional Articulations: Women's Rights, the Euro-
pean Court, and Supranational Constitutionalism, 38 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 489, 496-98 (2004).
104. See Hepple, supra note 99, at 431-32; see also PREcHAL & BuRRows, supra note
99, at 91-94, 14244
105. See generally PP.tcHAL & BuRRows, supra note 99.
106. See EEC Treaty, supra note 96, art. 6.
107. See Kenny v. Insurance Officer, Case 1/78, [1978] E.C.R. 1489, 1503.
108. See generally EEC Treaty, supra note 96.
109. See ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 211
(1999).
110. See Nanette A. Neuwahl, The Treaty on European Union: A Step Forward?, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1, 18 (Nanette A. Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds.,
1995).
111. See id. at 20; see also ARNULL, supra note 109, at 214-15.
112. See ARNuLL, supra note 109, at 215-17.
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therefore certain fundamental rights that the ECJ was prepared
to enforce." 13
As the cases went by, the ECJ developed this reasoning in an
important way. It began in Stauder v. Ulm," 4 in which a German
pensioner claimed that he should be able to buy butter at a re-
duced price." 5 Filling in a form in which he had to provide his
name and address was the only way for the pensioner to get the
butter at a reduced price. 6 In effect, the pensioner either had
to proclaim his poverty or buy butter that he could not afford at
the market price. The pensioner's pride made him feel as
though being forced to claim his poverty and give these details
to the officials, and possibly to his neighbors, constituted a viola-
tion of his right to privacy.' 17
The petitioner alleged that the forced disclosure of identity
and financial status was discriminatory against beneficiaries of
the discount and amounted to a violation of his fundamental
human rights under Germany's basic law." 8 The ECJ in this
early case did not make an order in his favor, declaring that the
regulations did not actually require him to give his name at all
and therefore did not violate the law." 9 The Court acknowl-
edged, however, that there are certain fundamental human
rights which the ECJ would enforce, rights similar to those en-
forced through the Strasbourg Court. 21
Beginning with the landmark case of Stauder, the Court be-
gan to talk about respect for fundamental rights as forming an
integral part of the general principles of laws that it would pro-
tect.12  It therefore indicated that it would respect certain fun-
damental rights even though the European Community is not a
party to the European Convention. 22 Where does one find
113. See id.
114. Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419.
115. See id. at 420.
116. See id. at 419.
117. See id. at 420.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 428.
120. See HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE LUXEMBOURG COURT OF
JUSTICE 396, 420 n.24 (1986).
121. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 397 (2000).
122. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER ET AL., THE LUXEMBOURG COURT AND NATIONAL
COURTS-DocTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE 317 (1998); see also ARNULL, supra note 109, at
204.
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those rights apart from the Convention? This is where an impor-
tant development took place through judge-made law.'12 The
ECJjudges in Luxembourg said that most of the European coun-
tries recognize certain important rights through their constitu-
tions, or, as in the case of the United Kingdom, through tradi-
tional jurisprudence. 24 Finding that these rights existed in one
form or another in the various member States, the Court deter-
mined that it must therefore protect these rights as part of the
structure of the European Community. 125 In this way, the Con-
vention has become the basis for parallel ideas supporting the
constitutional traditions of the various member States.1 26 In a
remarkable way for civil lawyers, the ECJ has recognized these
fundamental human rights over the years, a trend which has had
as much an effect in the United Kingdom as elsewhere. 27
But it did not stop there, for the Parliament of the Euro-
pean Union and the Council, consisting of the legislative body
and the Commission, all passed a resolution wholly approving
and endorsing what the Court has done through judge-made law
and recognizing that the precedents had become part of Com-
munity Law.' 28 Through an amendment, the European Union
then resolved to protect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the
European Convention and as a result of the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the member States as general principles of
community law.' 29 The Treaty of Rome also recognized these
fundamental rights and gave the Council of the European
Union the power to make regulations prohibiting violations of
specific human rights.' 0 One of the more recent regulations
123. See ARNuLL, supra note 109, at 223.
124. See id. at 204.
125. See id. at 204, 219.
126. See id. at 219.
127. See id. at 219, 223.
128. See SIEGBERT ALBER, REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, COMMUNITY LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE MEMBER STATES 10 (1997).
129. See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6, O.J. C 325/
5, at 11 (2002), 37 L.L.M. 67 [hereinafter Consolidated TEU], incorporating changes
made by Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), the Trea-
ties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Feb. 26, 2001, OJ.
C 80/1 (2001) [hereinafter Treaty of Nice] (amending TEU, Treaty establishing the
European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
130. See EEC Treaty, supra note 96.
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and directives deal with discrimination on the grounds of sex or
racial origin or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or
sexual orientation."' And so the third strand has become an
important one.
Historically, the European Convention, and, subsequently,
the European Union, have laid down laws which the British
courts in the European Community must enforce.13 2 Those
rights, however, only cover Community areas. A famous case
from Ireland involving students distributing leaflets advertising
abortion facilities in a London Clinic illustrates this point.
133
The government prosecuted the students for violating an Irish
criminal law prohibiting advertising and encouraging abor-
tion. 1 3  The students claimed that advertising and expressing
views on abortion clinics which were respectable in London, was
permissible, and that it was therefore protected as a fundamental
right under the third strand of European Community law.
1 35
While an interesting argument, the Court ruled against it in the
end because the students had not exercised a community
right.' 6 They had not exercised freedom of movement; they
had simply claimed the right of free speech, which was not part
of European Community law.1 37 If the clinics themselves had ad-
vertised, it would have been an interference with their freedom
to provide services, a Community law right.'33 The students,
however, could not rely on European Community law to exercise
this right." 9 Thus, in this third strand, the European Union im-
posed obvious limits, and so we move to the fourth strand.
By 1998 many people had come to realize that it was quite
absurd for the British citizen who wanted to claim a right under
the European Convention to go to Strasbourg. 4 ' Hence, while
the lawyers enjoyed trying cases in Strasbourg, the clients wanted
131. See European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Council Decision Estab-
lishing a Community Action Programme to Combat Discrimination (2001-2006), COM
(2000) 649 Final (2000).
132. See generally European Convention, supra note 51.








140. See European Convention, supra note 51.
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legal redress in the English courts. Many lobbied for a long time
that the Strasbourg Convention should become part of British
domestic law enforceable via statute. 141 Then in 1998 came the
enactment of the Human Rights Act, 4 2 which included all the
rights set out in the Strasbourg Charter except the right to an
effective remedy.143 It was argued that the Human Rights Act
provides that the right to life and all of these other rights are
spelled out the same way, and that the courts should therefore
have the power to strike down any legislation by Parliament or by
government minister inconsistent with the European Conven-
tion." In other words, give the courts the same power that they
have under European Community law to strike down any legisla-
tion inconsistent with the Treaty of Rome or any other
subordinate legislation. 145
England's Labour government knew, however, that if they
accepted this proposal, many people would oppose it.t 46 There-
fore, they adopted a modified form of power for the National
Court to exercise, and ordered English judges to take into ac-
count any judgment of the Strasbourg Court, or any opinion
given by the Commission when considering any question under
the European Convention. 147 The British Government did not
bind judges to Strasbourg Court decisions, but simply told them
to take such decisions into account.14 a Does "take into account"
mean read it, smile and ignore it, give some effect to it, or follow
it absolutely?14 9 The House of Lords heard a case in which the
government minister failed to do what obviously ought to have
been done and the question arose whether the British courts
141. See The Luxembourg Court of Human Rights, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
crime/law/echr.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
142. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
143. See id. § 9.
144. See id. § 2.
145. See The Luxembourg Court ofJustice and Case Law, available at http://www.eurole-
gal.org/yurp/ecj.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Publications: Briefings, available at http://www.farrer.co.uk/Default.
aspx?sID=17&cID=528&ctID=ll (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
148. See Press Release, Elizabeth Andersen, Human Rights Watch, U.K: New Anti-
Terror Law Rolls Back Rights (Dec. 14, 2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/
2001/12/Ukbilll214.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
149. See United Kingdom Parliament, Lord Hansard Text (Nov. 27, 1997), available
at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ldhansrd/
vo971127/text/71127-19.htm.
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should follow a very clear decision of the Strasbourg Court.5 °
Although the obligation is only to take into account Strasbourg
Court decisions, judges should follow the Strasbourg Court's
judgment if it is clear and unqualified. If the English judge does
not follow the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, the citizen
could still go to the Strasbourg Court and challenge the decision
of the House of Lords, in which case this court must give effect
to the claim.' 51 In any case, a clear following of Strasbourgjuris-
prudence by the British courts remains necessary. 152
The courts are also given the power to make declarations as
to whether legislation in the United Kingdom is compatible with
Strasbourg jurisprudence, leaving it to the Parliament and the
minister, if he so chooses, to take steps to put the law right.153 If
the minister thereby finds that the House of Lords or the Court
of Appeal has declared something to be unlawful and the Stras-
bourg Court has said the same thing, the minister can himself
make legislation to give effect to it. Perhaps most importantly,
the courts have the duty to read primary and subordinate legisla-
tion as far as possible in a way which remains compatible with
the Convention. 5' As a result, English judges spend a great deal
of time, instead of giving the ordinary meaning to words, trying
to give a definition or meaning consistent with the European
Convention.1 55 This is not always an easy task, and judges should
not be required to go to absurd lengths in order to construe
English legislation in accordance with the European Convention
150. Regina (Alconbury) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and
the Regions, 2 A.C. 295 (H.L. 2003).
151. See, e.g., Singh v. Entry Clearance Officer (New Delhi), EWCA Civ. 1075 (C.A.
2004), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2005) (deferring to Strasbourg Court's interpretation regarding legal concept of family
life); see also What are the Differences Between the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European
Convention on Human Rights, YourRights.org.uk, available at http://yourrights.org.uk/
faqs/human-rights-act/human-rights-act-differences.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
152. See id.
153. See Eurolegal Services, UK Human Rights, available at http://www.eurolegal.
org/british/ukhumanrights.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
154. See Regina (on the application of Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator, 2 A.C. 323,
(H.L. 2004), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/
ldjudgmt/jd040617/ullah-l.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005) ("It is indeed unlawful ...
for a public authority, including a court, to act in a way which is incompatible with a
Convention right."); see also Human Rights: The European Convention, Sept. 29, 2000,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/948143.stm (last visited Sept. 13, 2004); UK
Human Rights, supra note 153.
155. See UK Human Rights, supra note 153.
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unless it can be done reasonably. 116 Though it is often better for
the judge to say the law is bad and then to leave it to the Parlia-
ment to change it, the courts do their best to construe legislation
so as to make it compatible with the European Convention.
157
Many difficult questions have arisen under the Human
Rights Act. 158 Article 6, for example, prohibits the court from
violating the right to a fair trial, and lawyers are ingeniously ar-
guing that there are violations of this right in almost every aspect
of the criminal law process. 159 If the judge agrees and the case
arose before the Act came into force, the position remains obvi-
ous: the judge must declare it to be unlawful and there must be
another trial or the man must be acquitted.16 ° Suppose, how-
ever, that the failure to provide a fair trial took place before the
Act came into force. 16 1 If, for example, somebody was convicted
and a criminal procedure was followed before the Act came into
force, could the convicted person go to the courts and say that
the procedure violated the Human Rights Act and that therefore
his conviction must be set aside?162 Judges have been very much
divided on this question. We decided 3-2 in Regina v. Lambert
that courts must not set aside the conviction. 163 In the following
case, three members of the House of Lords held that the courts
should set aside the conviction. The House, however, stood be-
hind its earlier decision. 64 Although three of the judges
thought the law was wrong, it remains the law. 16 5 Then we de-
cided a third case in which the House of Lords went a step fur-
ther, saying that the question is not one which they should re-
view anymore. 166
There remains one final strand to discuss. The European
Convention is now a bit out of date, in that it does not address
several rights which people in 2003 would expect to be enforced.
Therefore, the European Community decided four or five years
156. See FINANCIAL SERVICES ON MARKETS, FIRST REPORT, 1999, Cm.
157. See Human Rights Act, 1998 (Eng.).
158. See FINANCIAL SERVICES ON MARKETS, supra note 156.
159. See, Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 6 (Eng.).




164. See Regina v. Kansal (No. 2), 2 A.C. 69, 81 (H.L. 2002).
165. See id. at 93-95.
166. See Regina v. Rezvi, 1 A.C. 1099 (H.L. 2003).
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ago that a commission should be established to reassess the dec-
laration of rights in the European Convention. The Commission
drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union ("CFREU"), and the States of the European Community
approved it in Nice. 6 7 It is a remarkable document, and de-
clares many rights which nobody would have thought of in 1950
when States first considered the European Convention: the
right to data protection,16 the right to DNA information,169 and
the right to physical and mental integrity,"' including the right
not to have your body used for purposes with which you disa-
gree, either in life or even after death. 1 ' Nobody in 1950 would
have ever thought of including these rights in the Convention,
e.g., in the fields of biology and medicine. The following princi-
ples were also included in the Convention: free and informed
consent of the person concerned,172 the right to liberty and se-
curity which is similar to the one granted in Article 5 of the Eu-
ropean Convention, 173 a right to freedom of expression, 174 and a
right to education. 175 Scientific research is now a human right
which shall be free of constraint. 76 The freedom to found edu-
cational establishments with due respect for democratic princi-
ples, as well as the right of parents to ensure that the education
of their children is in conformity with their religious, philosophi-
cal, and pedagogical convictions, is also guaranteed in accor-
dance with national laws governing the exercise of such free-
dom. 1 77 This is a much broader statement than anything the
Convention considered before.'78 The CFREU also guarantees
the right to asylum.' 79
In addition, the CFREU prohibits discrimination, not just
167. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 0.J. C 364/1
(2000) [hereinafter CFREU], pmbl.
168. See id. art. 8, § 1.
169. See id. art. 3, § 2.
170. See id. art. 3.
171. See id. art. 3, § 2.
172. See id. art. 8, § 2.
173. See id. art. 6; see also European Convention, supra note 51, art. 5 ("Everyone
has the right to liberty and security of person").
174. See CFREU, supra note 167, art. 11 § 1.
175. See id. art. 14, § 1.
176. See id. art. 3, §§ 1, 13.
177. See id. art. 14, § 3.
178. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 51, art. 2.
179. See CFREU, supra note 167, art. 18.
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with respect to wealth and nationality, but also based on sex,
race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, membership of a
national minority, property, birth, disability, age, and sexual ori-
entation. 8 ° In its current form, the CFREU seems to contain
almost everything that someone could think of. In ten years
time, however, somebody will have thought of other things
which ought to be protected against discrimination.
The question remains as to what effect the CFREU will have
on the laws of the States that have agreed to and signed it.'8 '
Prime Minister Blair returned to London, stating firmly that the
CFREU is simply a catalogue of existing rights.182 It is not cur-
rently enforceable as such in the National Courts.1 8 In future,
other States may give effect to it.184 This does not mean, how-
ever, that the CFREU does not have any effect on the courts of
the United Kingdom.' 85 In a number of cases, the Advocate-
General of the ECJ has stated firmly that although the CFREU is
not binding, it does give an indication of what a democratically
elected group of people think human rights should include.186
Britain should therefore seek to construe human rights in accor-
dance with the CFREU 187 The Commission of the European
Union in Brussels now checks new legislation against the CFREU
to ensure that there are no violations. 188 The European Union
ombudsman in Brussels also judges complaints, not just with re-
spect to the jurisprudence of the courts, but in relation to the
CFREU as well.189
The European community is currently engaged in numer-
ous discussions as to whether it should adopt a written constitu-
180. See id. arts. 21, 23.
181. See Ian Black, Members Back Citizens' Charter: Human Rights Articles Aim to Give
EU 'Moral Dimension, GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2000, at 6.
182. See id.
183. See id.; see also CFREU, supra note 167, art. 52.
184. See Black, supra note 181.
185. See, e.g., Commission v.Jego-Quere, Case C-263/02 P, [2004] E.C.R. _, [2003]
2 C.M.L.R. 44; see also R v. Visitor of King's College London, E.L.R. 29 (Q.B. 2004).
186. See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Constitutional
Document, 7 EUR. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 1, 37, 49 (2004).
187. See id.
188. See, e.g., Terence Daintith, The Constitutional Protection of Economic Rights, 2
INT'LJ. CON. L. 56 (2004).
189. See CFREU, supra note 167 art. 43.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
tion. 90 Those involved in its drafting have agreed on most of
the provisions which will be discussed by the States.' 9 ' Many of
these provisions will undoubtedly lead to serious disagreement,
but the general view appears to be that the CFREU should be a
part of any such constitution. 9 2 If such a constitution is drafted,
the CFREU will become legally binding and the citizens will have
the right to go to the national courts not only to enforce the
European Convention, but to enforce the rights set out in the
CFREU as well. The citizens will do so, not as part of the laws of
the Council of Europe Convention, but as part of European
Union law, which the judges are bound to enforce. Lawyers are
going to have an extremely interesting and difficult time coping
with some of these new ideas. Judges, too, will no doubt find it
difficult to enforce such provisions as those calling for the right
to academic freedom. Nonetheless, the CFREU will have a
profound effect on human rights in the United Kingdom if it
becomes a law.
The five strands discussed above will all come together and
English judges will not simply have to say, "Well, if it's not forbid-
den, you can do it." They will have to say, "Here is a right de-
clared not just by the Council of Europe, here is a right declared
by the European Union, which is binding on the National Court
and has to be enforced."
This continues to be an enormous topic of which scholars
have only begun to scratch the surface, but it is also one with the
potential to have a dramatic effect on the lives of ordinary peo-
ple in the United Kingdom. As time goes by, we will be in a
better position tojudge how the enforcement of human rights in
the United Kingdom compares to that in the United States.
190. See Straw Supports an EU "Constitution", BBC NEws, Feb. 21, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi /uk_politics/1833286.stm (last visited Sept 14, 2004). See
generally Roger J. Goebel, The European Union in Transition: the Treaty of Nice in Effect;
Enlargement in Sight; a Constitution in Doubt, 27 FoRDrtAM INT'L L.J. 455 (2004).
191. See Goebel, supra note 190, at 485-501.
192. See id.
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